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Abstract
A frequent form of pay-for-performance programs increase reimburse-
ment for all services by a certain percentage of the baseline price. We
examine how such a “bonus-for-quality” reimbursement scheme aﬀects
the wage contract given to physicians by the hospital management. To
this end, we determine the bonus inducing hospitals to incentivize their
physicians to meet the quality standard. Additionally, we show that the
health care payer has to complement the bonus with a (sometimes neg-
ative) block grant. We conclude the paper relating the role of the block
grant to recent experiences in the American health care market.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The provision of quality represents a major concern in the health care sector.
Many countries have introduced incentive programs rewarding a better per-
formance (often referred to as Pay(ing)-for-Performance,P 4 P ) .F o re x a m p l e ,
the U.S. Medicare Programme provides higher transfers to hospitals that per-
form well according to measurable quality indicators, such as rates of cervical
cancer screening and hemoglobin testing for diabetic patients. In the UK, gen-
eral practitioners who perform well on certain quality indicators, such as the
measurement of blood pressure and cholesterol in patients with ischemic heart
disease, receive substantial ﬁnancial rewards. These can amount to about 20%
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1of a general-practitioner’s budget (Doran et al., 2006). Similarly, other health
care payers have started to include ”rewards for quality” deals, see e.g. AIS
(2003) and Leapfrog (2007).
A frequent form of these P4P-programs reward hospitals (and physicians’
practice groups) ﬁnancially if a certain quality standard is met (Rosenthal et
al, 2004). Often these programs increase the reimbursement for all services
by a certain percentage of the baseline price the hospital would be reimbursed
otherwise. For example, PROMINA Health system, an Atlanta-area federation
of eight hospitals and nearly 4000 employed and outside physicians, has con-
tracted sizable quality reimbursement incentives with about 1500 physicians in
aﬃliated practices (AIS, 2003). If a practice meets a certain level of compliance
with quality standards (e.g. that a given percentage of pneumonia patients
must receive an antibiotic within four hours of being admitted) they receive
reimbursement for all services to CIGNA/PROMINA patients that is set a 5%
higher multiple of Medicare reimbursement than the baseline multiple such as
speciﬁed in PROMINA’s contract with CIGNA HealthCare of Georgia. Other
examples can be found in Rosenthal et al (2004).
Providing P4P-programs to hospitals does not automatically bring forward
higher quality. This is because hospitals consist of a hierarchy of decision-
makers. These decision-makers typically act as separate decision makers within
hospitals. For example, hospital managers decide on non-medical resources and
on contracts oﬀered to health care employees. These employees again decide
on how many patients to treat and on the quality of treatment (e.g. should
pneumonia patients be given antibiotic, which blood tests to take etc.). Often
the goals of the decision makers diﬀer. Managers might aim to maximize the
expected ﬁnancial surplus of the hospital, while the health personnel might
get some direct utility from quality provision. In this paper we address both
for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt hospital objectives. We stress that the eﬀect of
a P4P-program depends on the wage contracts given within hospitals when a
multi-tier hierarchy of principal-agent interactions are present. This in turn
implies that a rational hospital payer (the sponsor) will choose the parameters
of the reimbursement contract taking the consequences for the internal wage
contracts into account. Simply speaking, if the sponsor wants to improve on
quality, she has to design the hospital’s reimbursement contract in such a way
that the hospital manager oﬀers contracts that reward health personnel for
exerting more eﬀort on quality.
How should the sponsor design the reimbursement contract so that incentives
for higher quality are provided within hospitals? This is the issue we address
in this paper. Our model is a three-stage game with three players. At the ﬁrst
stage, a risk neutral sponsor (the health care payer) decides on the hospital’s
reimbursement scheme. Instead of assuming that the sponsor adopts an op-
timal contract approach, see e.g. Baron (1989) and Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005), we focus on a type of reimbursement contract widely observed between
sponsors and hospitals, namely that the sponsor pays the hospital according to
the number of patients treated, but the compensation per treatment depends on
2whether a certain quality standard is met or not.1 Accordingly, the sponsor sets
the bonus on reimbursement associated with providing the quality standard. In
addition to this performance-based payment, the sponsor provides the hospital
with a block grant. At the second stage, a risk neutral hospital manager oﬀers
the physician a wage contract with bonuses for quality and treatments, respec-
tively. Finally, at the third stage, a risk averse physician chooses his levels of
eﬀort on treatments and on quality, respectively. In addition to these active
players, fully insured patients seek treatment at the hospital. Patients’ utility
is increasing in the quality provided.
We begin with characterizing how the sponsor’s reimbursement scheme, char-
acterized by the bonus, the quality standard, and the block grant, aﬀects the
optimal wage contract within the hospital. It turns out that the sponsor must
set the bonus suﬃciently high to implement the quality standard. Failing this
optimal bonus by just a narrow margin, will induce the hospital manager to
provide too low quality incentives to the physician. The intuition is that the
hospital manager has to oﬀer the physician a bonus contract to ensure that
the physician exerts eﬀort on the quality task. The bonus contract exposes the
physician to risk, which the hospital management has to compensate for. If the
sponsor did not compensate the hospital for this extra risk cost, its management
would decide not to implement the quality standard. Empirically, this implies
that even when we observe that health care payers include rewards for quality in
hospitals’ remuneration contracts, hospitals may choose not to implement the
desired quality standard. Furthermore, the block grant should sometimes be
used to extract the extra surplus (proﬁt) the P4P-program enables the hospital
to generate (in these cases the block grant is negative). Whenever the sponsor
abstains from extracting the hospital proﬁt, the introduction of a P4P-program
will lead to higher costs for the sponsor and increased proﬁtability of health
care providers.
There exists a large literature on how hospital ﬁnancing aﬀects hospitals’
incentives to provide quality. Commonly this literature assumes that patients’
demand reﬂects their perceptions of the quality of services oﬀered and that
quality is non-contractable.2 I fp a t i e n t sa r ef r e et oc h o o s ep r o v i d e r s ,p a t i e n t s ’
demand can be a powerful mechanism for maintaining standards of services (see
e.g. Rogerson, 1994; Ma, 1994; and Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a). When
patient demand does not reﬂect quality, the optimal contract oﬀered by the
payer depends on whether the provider is entirely self-interested or benevolent,
having a genuine concern for patient welfare (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998b).
More recently, the literature on hospital ﬁnancing has adopted the viewpoint
that quality can be contracted upon.3 For instance, Eggleston (2005) examines
a model with two quality dimensions, one being contractable and the other not.
Eggleston shows that, if one dimension of quality is contractible, whereas the
1In section 5 we discuss why the sponsor might prefer such a reimbursement contract.
2See for example Pope, 1989; Ma, 1994; Rogerson, 1994; Ellis, 1998; Ellis and McGuire,
1990; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005.
3Rosenthal et al (2004) identify 37 separate incentive plans representing 31 diﬀerent (US)-
payers.
3other is not, the introduction of a P4P-program may increase service on the
veriﬁable quality dimension, but decrease service on the non-veriﬁable one. She
argues that incentives for non-veriﬁable quality can be restored by reducing P4P
on veriﬁable quality. Kaarbøe and Siciliani (2008) expand Eggleston’s model and
solve for the optimal incentive scheme for contractible quality. None of these
papers however investigate the internal organization of hospitals.
To our knowledge, only two papers account for the interaction between dif-
ferent decision-makers in a hospital-ﬁnancing framework, namely Custer et al
(1990) and Boadway et al (2004). Both papers study how the optimal pay-
ment scheme within a hierarchical model is aﬀected by the interaction between
the government and the hospital manager and between the manager and the
physician. The former paper assumes full information at all levels and analyzes
how the manager’s and physician’s incentive to behave cooperatively or not is
aﬀected by the way hospitals are ﬁnanced. The latter paper considers asym-
metric information about patients’ severity and hospital types. Contracts are
designed to elicit information about patients’ severity and hospital types in an
eﬃcient way, that is, contracts minimize the physician’s and the hospital’s in-
formation rent. The reimbursement contracts studied in these papers do not
contain P4P-elements.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, which
we analyze in Section 3. Section 4 extends the model to allow for a hospital
with direct quality concerns. In Section 5, we discuss results and assumptions
of our analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are three active players, the sponsor, the (hospital) manager, and the
physician. The sponsor provides reimbursement to the hospital, the manager
oﬀers an incentive contract to the physician, and the physician provides eﬀort
on two tasks: the provision of patient treatment (z) and quality (q)( b o t hw i t h
associated veriﬁable signals). In addition to these players, fully insured patients,
whose utility is increasing in the quality provided, seek treatment at the hospital.
We assume that demand for hospital services is so high that the hospital is not
demand constrained.
The game has three stages. At the ﬁrst stage, the risk neutral sponsor decides
on the hospital’s reimbursement scheme, R(·), and on the quality standard Q ≥
0,g i v e nh e rﬁxed (exogenous) budget B>0 available to buy hospital services.
We assume that the sponsor maximizes expected net consumer surplus.
Hence, her objective is to minimize the cost of implementing the quality stan-
dard. Furthermore, the quality standard is set as the highest one the sponsor
can aﬀord giver her ﬁxed budget B>0, and given the hospital breaks even.
The sponsor pays the hospital a performance-based payment according to the
number of patients treated, z>0, but the price the hospital gets per treatment
depends on whether realized quality q meets the quality standard, Q ≥ 0, or
4not.




if q ≥ Qand
otherwise.
Accordingly, the sponsor decides on the bonus P that is paid upon providing the
quality standard. Notice that since the sponsor maximizes net consumer surplus,
she will never punish the hospital for providing quality (hence P ≥ 1). In
addition to this performance-based payment, the sponsor provides the hospital
a block grant H ≶ 0 (to ensure that the hospital break even).
At the second stage, the risk neutral manager decides on the physician’s
payment, w. Her net beneﬁti sg i v e nb yR−w. She only cares for the hospital’s
ﬁnancial surplus, either because it is a for-proﬁt hospital or because the surplus
can be spent on perks for staﬀ or on improving facilities.4 The manager only
observes the treatment and quality signals, and uses these signals in the payment
scheme she oﬀers the physician. The manager oﬀers the physician a linear wage
contract,
w = A + αz + βq,
where α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 represent the incentives on the treatment task z and
the quality task q, respectively.5
At the third stage, the risk averse physician chooses eﬀort exerted on the
production of treatment z a n do nq u a l i t yq, labelled a and b, respectively. These
choices are private information to the physician. Costs of eﬀort (in monetary
units) are denoted c(a,b), where c(·,·) is strictly convex and eﬀort costs are




The physician’s choice of eﬀort produces patient treatment
z = fa+ ζ
and the quality level
q = b + χ.
The noise terms ζ and χ represent the eﬀects of uncontrollable events. We
assume that ζ ∼ N(0,σ2
z),χ∼ N(0,σ2
q), with strictly positive variance of qual-
ity noise, σ2
q > 0. The parameter f>0 represents the physician’s productivity
of treatment eﬀort; the productivity parameter associated with quality produc-
tion is normalized to one. All noise terms are independent of each other. All
parties observe (z,q).
The physician’s utility function is exponential, u = −exp{−r(w − c(a,b))},
where the coeﬃcient r>0 measures the physician’s degree of constant absolute
4In section 4 we show that the model also covers the case where the management cares
about the patients (i.e., the quality of treatment provied) or, more speciﬁcally, where the
utility of the hospital management depends upon a weighted sum of provider proﬁts and
quality.
5The focus on linear contracts can be justiﬁed by appeal to a richer dynamic model in
which linear payments are optimal (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987).
5risk aversion. With linear compensation, exponential utility, and normally dis-
tributed random variables, maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the physician’s certainty equivalent, CE = E[w] − c(a,b) − r
2var[w],
where E is the expectation operator. Without loss of generality we assume that
the physician’s outside option is normalized to zero.
3T h e A n a l y s i s
3.1 The Wage Contract
To characterize the optimal linear wage contract inside the hospital, we solve
the model by backward induction, starting with the physician’s eﬀort decisions
at stage three.














q. Hence, the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution
read
αf = ca(a,b)=a
β = cb(a,b)=b, (1)
where ci(a,b) denotes the partial derivative of the cost function w.r.t. i =
a,b. The second-order conditions are satisﬁed since the cost function is strictly
convex.
The manager can always ensure the physician’s participation by adjusting
the ﬁxed wage component such that the physician’s participation constraint
holds. For each type of eﬀort (treatment vs. quality), the relative size of pro-
ductivity and risk determines whether bonus pay has to be complemented with
some ﬁxed wage payment or not.
At stage two, the manager maximizes the diﬀerence between expected rev-
enue and wage costs subject to the physician’s participation constraint CE ≥ 0.









s.t. αf = ca(a,b)
β = cb(a,b).
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the manager’s optimization problem read:6
f2 (1 + (P − 1)(1 − G(Q − β))) = αKz and
f2α(P − 1)g(Q − β)=βKq, (2)
6Expected revenue is E[zP(q)] = E[z] · E[P(q)] = fa[P (1 − G(Q − b)) + G(Q − b)] =
f2α(1 + (P − 1)(1 − G(Q − β))).
6where G(·) denotes the Normal distribution function associated with quality











represent the marginal cost of eﬀort and
risk on treatments and quality, respectively. Notice that, since the ﬁrst-order
conditions (2) represent a non-linear system in α and β, it is not possible to
derive an explicit solution that applies to all values of Q and P. In the appendix
we show that a solution to (2) exists for all values of Q ≥ 0 and P ≥ 1.
Furthermore, the second-order conditions for a maximum requires the value of
production to be suﬃciently large relative to the cost of risk and eﬀort.7
The optimal contract characterized by (2) represents the solution provided
the manager’s participation constraint hold. Notice that the sponsor can always
ensure the manager’s participation by setting the block grant H suﬃciently high.
3.2 The Optimal Reimbursement Contract
In this section we derive the optimal reimbursement contract. First we consider
the performance-based payment. Second, we determine the size of the block
grant.
3.2.1 The Performance-Based Payment
At stage one the sponsor aims at implementing a speciﬁc quality standard Q in
expected terms,
Q = E[q]=b = β ≥ 0, (3)
where the second equality follows from the production technology and the third
from the physician’s ﬁrst-order condition (1).
In order to induce the manager to oﬀer β = b = Q, the sponsor must set the
bonus P such that the ﬁrst-order conditions of the manager (2) are satisﬁed.





















The optimal treatment incentive α is similar to the one obtained in the stan-
dard principal agent model with linear contracts (see e.g. Gibbons and Mur-
phy, 1992; Kaarboe and Olsen, 2005). The optimal intensity of the treatment-
incentive is reached when the net marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n gα equals the
marginal transaction cost of α. To see this, note that the expected net marginal
beneﬁto fe x t r ae ﬀort is f((P +1 )/2 − ca(a)). Furthermore it follows from the
physician’s ﬁrst-order conditions that the rate at which extra eﬀort is supplied
7Technically, the assumption reads f4 >π σ 2
qKqKz/2.
7for each extra unit of intensity is f (because of caa(a)=1 ) .S i n c e t h e p h y s i -
cian will choose treatment eﬀort such that a = αf, the net marginal beneﬁti s
f2((P +1 )/2 −α). The transaction cost associated with α is the risk premium
with marginal cost αrσ2
z. Thus, f2((P +1 )/2 − α)=αrσ2
z which is equivalent
to α =( P +1 )f2/(2Kz).
To obtain the Q-implementing bonus, we solve β = Q and (5) for P.
Proposition 1 To implement the quality standard Q in expectation, the spon-








to be paid whenever realized quality exceeds Q, i.e. q ≥ Q. We have P∗ > 1 for
strictly positive quality standards, Q>0.
A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n1t h es p o n s o rm u s ts e tt h eb o n u ss u ﬃciently high
to implement the quality standard. That is, she must compensate the hospital
for more than the pure eﬀort cost of providing the quality standard. The reason
for this is twofold. First, the manager has to oﬀer the physician a bonus contract
to ensure that he exerts eﬀort on the quality task. The bonus contract exposes
the physician to risk, which has to be compensated. Second, the increased bonus
increases the marginal value of treatments, and hence the optimal incentive on
this task. Higher incentives increase the variability of the physician’s wage.
If the sponsor did not compensate the hospital for these two types of extra
risk cost, its manager would head for a lower level of expected quality. Exam-
ining the out-of-equilibrium behavior, we ﬁnd that the exact level of expected
quality depends on whether the sponsor also adjusts the block grant. If the
block grant is not adjusted, zero expected quality is provided. Otherwise ex-
pected quality is lower than intended, but still positive. Hence failing to set the
right reimbursement incentive by just a narrow margin results in too low quality
incentives (β<β
∗). Empirically, this implies that even if one observes that the
sponsor includes rewards for quality in hospitals’ remuneration contracts, their
managers may choose not to implement the desired quality standard.
Straightforward calculations establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The bonus P∗ implementing the quality standard Q ≥ 0 in
expectation is
(i) strictly increasing in Q ≥ 0,
(ii) increasing in the noisiness of the treatment signal σ2
z,a n d
(iii) increasing in the noisiness of the quality signal σ2
q.
Monotonicity is strict in case (iii) for Q>0, and in case (ii) if r>0 and
Q>0.
Proof. Appendix. ¥
Part (i) says the higher the quality standard, the higher the bonus has to be.
This raises risk and eﬀort costs, both of which the sponsor has to compensate.
8Part (ii) holds because the incentive to treat patients, α, is decreasing in the
noisiness of the treatment signal for any bonus P ≥ 0. Marginal revenue on
the quality task would be reduced. But since risk and eﬀort cost on the quality
task remain unaﬀected, the bonus P must be raised in order to ensure that the
hospital management still chooses to implement the quality standard.
Part (iii) is due to the fact that the manager must compensate the physician
for the increased wage uncertainty associated with the quality task.
Finally, there is a diﬀerence between noise on the treatment signal and noise
on the quality signal. While the bonus strictly increases in treatment noise only
for strictly positive degrees of risk aversion, r>0, it strictly increases in quality
noise even in the absence of risk aversion, i.e. for all r ≥ 0 (given Q>0). The
reason is the following: treatment noise only takes eﬀect via the physician’s risk
aversion; quality noise enters both through the physician’s risk aversion and
through uncertainty of the bonus; a small increase in quality noise implies that
expected marginal revenue decreases for both tasks.8
3.2.2 The Block Grant
We now calculate the block grant required to let the hospital break even. Recall
the expected surplus between hospital management and physician:




Since the sponsor only needs to ensure that the hospital breaks even, the block
grant H is set such that Π =0 . Inserting equilibrium eﬀort, equilibrium incen-
tives and the Q-implementing bonus P∗, we obtain:


















The block grant has the following properties:
(i) H(0) = −
f4
4Kz < 0, (ii) H0(0) < 0, (iii) there exists Q∗ > 0 such that
H0(Q) < 0 for Q<Q ∗ and H0(Q) ≥ 0 for Q ≥ Q∗, and (iv) H00(Q) > 0.












At Q =0the block grant is strictly negative. Although no quality is incen-
tivized, an expected rent is created between hospital and physician. Since the
8To see this, evaluate the left hand side of the manager’s ﬁrst order conditions (2) at β = Q
and diﬀerentiate them with respect to quality noise σ2
q.
9sponsor only needs to ensure that the hospital breaks even, the block grant is
used to extract the surplus.
The block grant strictly decreases in the quality standard up to some thresh-
old Q∗, i.e. for 0 ≤ Q<Q ∗, and increases for quality levels above this threshold,
Q>Q ∗. For large quality levels, the sponsor has to complement the bonus with
a positive block grant to ensure the hospital participates.




[Figure 1 about here]
From the ﬁgure we see that the block grant is negative for 0 ≤ Q . 3.13 and
positive for Q & 3.13. The block grant has it’s minimum value when Q∗ ' 1.03.
3.3 Comparative Statics on Incentives
After calculating the optimal reimbursement scheme, we now present compara-
tive statics results on the optimal incentives. Resubstituting P∗ into equations
(4), and (5), we obtain:










(i) strictly increases in the quality standard Q ≥ 0,
(ii) decreases in the noisiness of the treatment signal σ2
z (with strict monotonic-
ity for r>0), and
(iii) increases in the noisiness of the quality signal σ2
q (with strict monotonicity
for Q>0 and r ≥ 0).
(b) The physician’s incentive to provide quality is given by β
∗ = Q.
Proof. Appendix. ¥
The optimal treatment incentive α∗ directly inherits most monotonicity
properties from the Q-implementing bonus P∗. Only how the optimal treatment
incentive varies with increased noise of the treatment signal remains ambigu-
ous. There are two eﬀects to be taken into account. First, given the sponsor
keeps the bonus constant, the optimal incentive is decreasing in σ2
z. This is the
traditional eﬀect of increased uncertainty on optimal incentives (see. e.g. Gib-
bons and Murphy, 1992). Second, the sponsor’s response to increased noisiness
of the treatment signal is to increase the bonus (as shown in Proposition 2),
which makes treatment of patients more valuable for the hospital. The proof
shows that the direct eﬀect of increased uncertainty on the incentive dominates
the indirect price eﬀect so, overall, the optimal incentive to treat patients is
decreasing in the noisiness of the treatment signal.
10The physician’s incentive to provide quality equals the quality standard.
This directly follows from the production technology (E[q]=b)a n dt h ep h y s i -
cian’s ﬁrst order conditions (β = cb(a,b)=b).
4 Hospitals with direct quality concerns
To cover the case of non-proﬁt hospitals, we extend the model outlined in Section
2t oc o v e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h eh o s p i t a l manager’s objective depends on both
hospital proﬁt and the (monetarized) quality of treatment. For the sake of
comparison, we leave the physician’s objective unchanged, i.e. the physician
has no direct quality concern. In Section 5, we discuss how the model can be
adapted to address the case of quality-oriented physicians.
Following Ellis and McGuire (1986) and Ellis (1998), let the manager’s ob-
jective function be E[(1 − ξ)zP(q)+ξvq − w], where ξ ∈ (0,1) represents the
weight associated with quality and 1 − ξ the weight on hospital proﬁt. The
constant v>0 transforms the units of quality into units of the reimbursement
currency. In the following, we focus on the bonus of the reimbursement contract.
The block grant can be calculated similarly to the above.
4.1 The Performance-Based Bonus









s.t. αf = ca(a,b) and
β = cb(a,b).
Rewriting the manager’s expected beneﬁt,
E[(1 − ξ)zP(q)+ξvq]
=( 1 − ξ)
¡
f2α(1 + (P − 1)(1 − G(Q − β)))
¢
+ ξvβ,
the hospital’s ﬁrst order conditions change into
(1 − ξ)f2 (1 + (P − 1)(1 − G(Q − β))) = αKz and
(1 − ξ)f2α(P − 1)g(Q − β)+ξv = βKq. (10)
As the sponsor aims at implementing the quality standard Q in expectation,
E[q]=Q, he must set the bonus P such that equations (10) are satisﬁed.


















Finally, we solve β = Q for P to determine the Q-implementing bonus.
11Proposition 5 To implement the quality standard Q in expectation, the spon-







2πσqKz (QKq − ξv)
f4 (1 − ξ)
2 (11)
for Q ≥ ξv/Kq. We have P∗
ξ > 1 for Q>ξ v / K q. Moreover, the bonus increases






When the manager has direct quality concerns, ξ>0, the sponsor gets the
quality level Q = ξv/Kq for free (which corresponds to a bonus of P =1 ). In
this case the direct quality concern of the manager has a similar eﬀect as a lower
outside option. To implement a speciﬁc quality level, the sponsor has to pay the
less (to ensure the hospital’s participation), the stronger the hospital is directly
concerned about quality.
Any level of quality higher than Q = ξv/Kq requires a bonus larger than one,
i.e. P∗
ξ > 1. In this case, an increase in the manager’s direct quality concern,
ξ, has two eﬀects on the manager’s beneﬁt (given that the quality standard re-
mains unchanged). First, it increases the (marginal) direct beneﬁt from quality.
Second, it decreases the (marginal) beneﬁt of income. For any given quality
standard, the change in the bonus has to balance these two eﬀects. If the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates, the bonus is reduced (and raised otherwise). The former hap-
pens for low levels of the quality standard, Q ∈ (ξv/Kq,(ξ +1 )v/(2Kq)), the
latter for higher levels, Q>(ξ +1 )v/(2Kq).
We end this section by showing that the optimal treatment incentive, α∗,
decreases with the manager’s direct quality concern ξ. Diﬀerentiating the equi-
librium incentive for treatments with respect to ξ, we obtain:
Proposition 6 The equilibrium incentive for treatments, α, decreases with the





























An increase in the manager’s direct quality concern has two eﬀects on the
optimal treatment incentive: First, it reduces the (marginal) beneﬁto ft h e
hospital’s expected revenue, given that the bonus remains constant. In this
case, the manager will reduce the physician’s incentive to treat patients. This is
12a direct eﬀect. Second, the (marginal) beneﬁt of the hospital’s expected revenue
depends on the bonus, which might both decrease or increase (see Proposition
5). This is an indirect eﬀect. If the bonus decreases both eﬀects are negative.
If the bonus increases, the direct eﬀect dominates. In any case, the number of
patients treated decreases with the manager’s direct quality concern ξ.
5 Discussion
So far we have assumed that the sponsor maximizes expected net consumer
surplus, which is equivalent to minimizing the cost of implementing the quality
standard. One implication of this objective is that the sponsor always adjusts
the block grant so that the hospital breaks even. The sponsor might however
also put some weight on producer interest, i.e. on hospital proﬁt. One rationale
of such behavior can be that the hospital provides tax income and local jobs.
If the sponsor puts some weight on hospital proﬁt, the introduction of pay-for-
performance might increase hospital proﬁt.
That providers increase their gross income when a P4P-program is intro-
duced is exactly what happened for U.K. family practitioners, where such a
program was introduced in 2004. This program increased existing income ac-
cording to performance with respect to 146 quality indicators including clinical
care for 10 chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience. In
2004, the P4P-program increased the gross income of the family practitioner
by about 0.32%, and in 2005/06 family practitioner income will rise even more
(since quality payments have been increased; see Doran et al. 2006). Another
example where the introduction of pay-for-performance will increase hospital
p a y m e n t si st h ep r o g r a mb e t w e e nA n t h e mB l u eC r o s sa n dB l u eS h i e l dM i d w e s t
and 38 hospitals in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. According to the program, a
quality bonus is given if certain performance measures in the dimensions out-
come, process, and structure are reached. Hospitals do not risk losing money
by taking part in this program. Reimbursement goes up based on a good report
card, but they cannot go down for a bad one (Leapfrog, 2007).
Notice that in our model the hospital would lobby for the bounded quality
level Q∗ in equation (9), given that the introduction of a pay-for-performance
program would not adjust the block grant. This contrasts with the case where
the sponsor provides the hospital with direct quality incentives, which are inde-
pendent of the number of treatments (e.g. when remuneration takes the form of
R = E[z]+P · E[q]). In this case, the hospital’s proﬁt is unbounded in Q. Put
diﬀerently, whenever the hospital has a strong bargaining power, it can force
the sponsor to oﬀer a higher quality level than the sponsor would prefer (and
the sponsor has to pay for it). By tying the quality bonus to the number of
treatments, provides the sponsor with a commitment device to avoid this way
of exploitation.9
9In 2003, PaciﬁCare began paying its California medical groups bonuses according to meet-
ing or exceeding 10 clinical and service quality targets. The bonus payments were tied to the
per member payments. The bonus potential represented about 5% of the capitation paid by
13In the paper we have assumed that the sponsor cannot contract directly with
the physician. One rationale for this assumption is that the manager has better
information about the physician’s productivity so that hiring a manager is a
w a yt os a v er i s kc o s t sf o rt h es p o n s o r . 10 A way to include a more active role
for the manager in our model is to assume that the physician’s productivity on
each of the two tasks is symmetrically distributed and independent of the tasks’
noise terms. Our results will continue to hold true if the timing of events is such
that the manager learns the physician’s productivity after the contract with the
sponsor has been signed.
We have assumed that the physician does not directly care for quality. One
way to include a direct concern for quality would be to assume that the physi-
cian obtains direct utility also from quality. Her utility function will then read
u = −exp{−r(w + γq − c(a,b))}, where γq represents the direct quality con-









. The term β +γ represents the total incentive, i.e. the
sum of monetary incentive and the implicit incentive resulting from the physi-
cian’s direct quality concern. It follows that the physician’s ideal quality eﬀort
is some positive level γ>0. Like in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), the physi-
cian prefers to exert some eﬀort in the absence of any ﬁnancial incentive rather
than being totally idle at work. By normalizing the physician’s quality concern
to zero, we obtain the model presented in this paper.
We end this section by noting that if the sponsor contracts with more than
one hospital, the possibility to use relative-performance-pay arises. This type
of approach is used in Medicare’s Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demon-
stration, where all hospitals are ranked and bonuses are paid to hospitals in
the top two deciles of performance. Performance-pay based on relative perfor-
mance reduces the ﬁnancial risk for the sponsor because the number of hospitals
that will receive an incentive is predictable. However, the level of performance
required to trigger an incentive payment is unknown at the start of the year,
thus creating uncertainty for hospitals in their own budgeting. In this respect
relative-performance-pay may increase the risk costs, which in the end the spon-
sor has to compensate.11
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have investigated how hospital reimbursement aﬀects the inter-
nal wage contracts between physicians and the hospital. To this end, we have
examined a particular frequent form of pay-for-performance program, which re-
wards hospitals ﬁnancially whenever they meet a prespeciﬁed quality standard.
the plan, Rosental et al (2005).
10One other rationale is that this is exactly what we observe in reality. Hospitals have
managers who are responsible for contracting with the staﬀ.
11Note that relative performance evaluation typically reduces the risk if the agents’ actions
are correlated (this follows from the informativeness principle, Holmstrom, 1979). It seems
however reasonable to assume that the production of quality is uncorrelated among hospitals.
14We have labeled this form of remuneration bonus-for-quality reimbursement.
For the hospital, bonus-for-quality reimbursement has two eﬀects. On the
one hand, the incentive to treat patients is raised. On the other, an incentive
to meet the quality standard is created. The hospital will adjust the linear
wage contract oﬀered to the physician accordingly. First, the wage contract
must incentivize quality (and treatment) eﬀort by the physician. Otherwise, the
physician will not exert quality (nor treatment) eﬀort. Second, the uncertainty
associated with quality (and treatment) production results in wage uncertainty
for which the physician has to be compensated for. Third, the equilibrium
quality incentive is the stronger, the higher the prespeciﬁed quality standard.
Fourth and ﬁnally, the equilibrium treatment incentive increases in the quality
standard and in the uncertainty of quality, but decreases in the uncertainty of
treatments.
The sponsor has to take this into account when specifying the bonus. Any
positive level of quality standard (or quality improvement) requires a bonus
above the 100 per cent level of baseline reimbursement. The higher the quality
standard, the higher the bonus has to be. A higher uncertainty of quality or
treatments necessitates a higher bonus.
Notice that the sponsor must set the price suﬃciently high to implement
the quality standard. For, the hospital manager has to oﬀer the agent a quality
bonus to ensure that the agent exerts eﬀort on quality. The bonus contract
exposes the agent to risk, which the hospital management has to compensate
for. If the sponsor did not compensate the hospital for these two types of extra
risk cost, its manager would head for a lower level of expected quality. Failing
to set the right reimbursement incentive by just a narrow margin results in
too low quality incentives (β<β
∗). Empirically, this implies that even if one
observes that the sponsor includes rewards for quality in hospitals’ remuneration
contracts, their managers may choose not to implement the desired quality
standard.
In his editorial, Epstein (2006) reminds us that policy chances might lead to
unexpected consequences, such as higher payments to physicians and increased
budget deﬁcits. From the model outlined in this paper we learn that the sponsor
should adjust all elements in the reimbursement contract when introducing P4P-
programs. Failing to do so will lead to higher cost for the sponsor and increased
proﬁtability of health care providers (in most cases).
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177A p p e n d i x
The appendix contains the proofs.
Proof (Existence of equilibrium incentives)
Recall equations (2). First consider P =1 . It follows from (2) that β =0
and hence α = f2/Kz.




f2 (P − 1)g(Q − β)
.
Inserting this into the second equation in (2), we obtain
f4 (P − 1)g(Q − β)[1+(P − 1)(1 − G(Q − β))] = βKqKz. (12)
Evaluating both sides of the equation at β =0 , we have
f4 (P − 1)g(Q)[1+(P − 1)(1 − G(Q))] > 0
because of P>1,g(Q) > 0,a n dG(Q) ∈ [0,1]. Taking the limit β →∞in
(12), the left hand side converges to zero, whereas the right hand side approaches
inﬁnity. Since both sides of equation (12) are continuous in β, it follows from
the intermediate value theorem that a solution β
∗ > 0 to (12) exists. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The payer’s reimbursement price needed to implement an arbitrary quality



































































with strict inequality if and only if Q>0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Derivation of the block grant (8). Inserting the Q-implementing bonus,
P∗, and the equilibrium incentive, α =( 1+P∗)f2/(2Kz), into equation (7),
we obtain:




















































































































































Correspondingly, the ﬁrst order condition of minimizing the block grant with




















q =0 . (14)





















We obtain ϕ(Q1)=2 f2√
































i.e. ϕ(Q2)=0and ϕ(Q3)=2 f2√
2πσq > 0.




















































































which completes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4


























the claim follows from Proposition 2.
































Since the inequality holds strictly for arbitrary Q ≥ 0, the incentive α∗ is
(strictly) decreasing in σ2
z for r(>) ≥ 0.











the claim follows from Proposition 2. ¥
21P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
What is left to prove is the last claim, i.e. the reimbursement price increases
with the hospital’s quality concern ξ if and only if QKq >
(ξ+1)v






2πσqKz (−ξv +2 QKq − v)










P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
Inserting the Q-implementing price P∗



















2πσqKz (QKq − ξv)

































2f2Kz (1 − ξ)P∗
ξ
,
which is negative. The second equality in Proposition 6 follows from the chain
rule. ¥
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